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Governing culture: legislators, interpreters and accountants 
 
Abstract 
Cultural policy has become dominated by questions of how to account for the intangible value of 
government investments. This is as a result of longstanding developments within government’s approaches 
to policy making, most notably those influenced by practices of audit and accounting. This paper will 
outline these developments with reference to Peter Miller’s concept of calculative practices, and will argue 
two central points: first, that there are practical solutions to the problem of measuring the value of culture 
that connect central government discourses with the discourses of the cultural sector; and second, the 
paper will demonstrate how academic work has been central to this area of policy making. As a result of 
the centrality of accounting academics in cultural policy, for example in providing advice on the appropriate 
measurement tools and techniques, questions are raised about the role academia might take vis-à-vis 
public policy. Accounting professionals and academics not only provide technical expertise that informs 
state calculative practices, but also play a surveillance role through the audit and evaluation of government 
programmes, and act as interpreters in defining terms of performance measurement, success and failure. 
The paper therefore concludes by reflecting on recent work by Phillip Schlesinger to preserve academic 
integrity whilst allowing accounting scholars and academics influence and partnership in policy. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the practices associated with governing culture. Whilst 
questions associated with this area were traditionally the preserve of cultural studies, they have become 
important for scholars in a range of fields, including studies of accounting (Zan, 2006, 2000 ; Christiansen 
and Skaerbaek, 1997; Oakes and Oakes, 2012). Alongside the emerging attention given to accounting 
practices for cultural policy and cultural organisations, the role of accounting in restructuring the state has 
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been an important area of study (Lapsley, 1999, 2008, offer an overview). State restructuring, particularly 
along the lines of the New Public Management (NPM) has been an activity that provides an important 
contextual factor in justifying accounting’s interest in the arts and culture. Finally the actual practices of 
accounting, what Miller (2001) terms the calculative practices found across a range of public and private 
sector settings, are the objects of analysis that can provide the bridge between arts management and 
accounting. 
The rise of NPM has gone hand in hand with other changes confronting cultural organisations. 
Trends within government have, in turn, played out alongside trends within the cultural sector, as state-led 
reform of cultural funding interacted with challenges to the assumptions prevailing across the cultural 
sector. These assumptions include the role of the audience, the primacy of the artist, and justifications for 
funding culture. Moreover, the assumption within much of the literature on cultural organisations is of the 
distance between the accounting practices of the state and the values of the cultural organisation 
(although deconstructed by Zan, 2000). Even where there are overlapping discourses, for example the 
entrepreneurial aspects of NPM (Lapsley, 2008) and those of the cultural industries, these moments of 
dialogue are played down or denied.  
The paper will consider these debates by placing them in the context of work on the state as an 
organ dominated by calculative practices. British government has attempted to fit culture into accounting 
frameworks by developing research partnerships with academics. The paper draws on the two reports that 
were the result of two phases of this academic work with the UK’s Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport (DCMS). The paper contends that by understanding government as a site for measurement and 
calculation we can best make sense of the conflict between aesthetics and accounting practices that are at 
the heart of the modern government of culture. It presents a solution to this conflict grounded in a mixed-
methods approach that accords both with British central government’s demand for transparency through 
calculation and a recognition of the potential for the aesthetic to escape metrics. 
Accounting professionals and academics not only provide technical expertise that informs state 
calculative practices, but also play a surveillance role through the audit and evaluation of government 
programmes, and act as interpreters in defining terms of performance measurement, success and failure. 
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In this light the paper reflects on the role of the accounting academic and Zygmunt Bauman’s discussion of 
the question of academia and intellectuals as legislators or interpreters. The paper concludes by reflecting 
on recent work by Phillip Schlesinger to preserve academic integrity whilst allowing academic influence and 
partnership in policy. 
 
2. Aesthetics and accounting 
Zan (2012: 3) asks why management or accounting scholars should be concerned with arts and cultural 
organisations. The answer to this question involves understanding what Vollmer (2003: 354; 363) describes 
as an ‘alternative accounting discourse’: a sociology of accounting created by accounting scholars that 
focuses on accounting, government and governance. This literature draws heavily on the idea of calculative 
practices developed by Rose and Miller (1992) and  Miller (2001), which is in turn derived from the work of 
Michel Foucault on governmentality and of Bruno Latour on inscription and on networks. The central 
theme of this alternative accounting discourse is how economic governance and calculative practices shape 
social order (2003: 353). 
 Miller (2001: 391) observes that ‘The calculative practices and language of accountancy have 
seeped into everyday life’. The seemingly ‘humble and mundane mechanisms by which authorities seek to 
instantiate government: techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination 
and assessment’ are in fact ‘technologies of governance’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 183), the numerical glue 
that binds together the complex network of techniques and actors through which governmental 
programmes ‘are articulated and made operable’ (Miller, 2001: 239). Put simply, calculative practices, such 
as counting, evaluating and inscribing, are part of a common language shared across varied enterprises in 
the public and private sectors, and even within the domestic realm. These technologies of government 
impose norms by which individuals and groups regulate their actions in terms of setting goals and recording 
outcomes. Rose and Miller call this ‘action at a distance’, a cornerstone of modern government (Rose and 
Miller, 1992: 187). Central government sets the terms by which various economic actors must calculate, 
and public funds are allocated or withheld within the network on this basis – most notably within neo-
liberal regimes which ‘seek both to create a distance between the formal institutions of the state and the 
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other social actors, and to act upon them in a different manner’ (1992: 198; 199) so that ‘[c]hoosing actors 
may govern themselves by numbers’ (Rose 1991: 691). It follows that while individual actors are apparently 
free to choose their actions, they are engaged within ‘asymmetrical networks of influence and control’ 
(Miller, 2001: 381). 
 In this context, ‘one of the principal achievements of management accounting is to link together 
responsibility and calculation: to create the responsible and calculating individual’ (Miller, 2001: 380). 
Through setting standardised targets, individual actors freely pursuing economic norms have become 
regulated, and thus ‘accounting has become a body of expertise focused on enacting responsibility from 
individuals rendered calculable and comparable.’ For Miller, the key defining feature of the calculative 
practices of accountancy is ‘their ability to translate diverse and complex processes into a single financial 
figure’ (2001: 381) with the veneer of an objective, political neutrality (2001: 382). Calculative practices 
extend across, and make commensurable, virtually all public, private and domestic realms, no matter how 
disparate:  ‘Not only can the manager of a global corporation be governed in this manner, but so too can a 
doctor, a schoolteacher, or a social worker’ (2001: 238), or indeed actors within the cultural sector. As 
Miller puts it, ‘The management of almost any organization can be transformed into a complex of incessant 
calculations’ (2001: 381). We now turn to the cultural sector and examples of the ‘alternative accounting 
discourse’ that builds upon this literature. 
 In a case study observing the implementation of a new management control system at the Royal 
Danish Theatre, Christiansen and Skaerbaek set out to study how ‘organizations dominated by a rationality 
very different from an accounting and administration perspective react when a rational budgeting system is 
put on the agenda’ (1997: 406). They highlight the influence of accounting systems on individual and group 
goal-setting and motivation (1997: 408), and that accounting systems are not neutral frameworks that just 
need to be implemented, but rather are given meaning in, or are constituted by, their use (1997: 410). 
Their empirical findings support the work of Miller and O’Leary (1993) which suggest that accounting 
systems lead to a ‘focus on calculation of abstract figures representing the production process’ and so 
‘remove management from production’. Therefore Christiansen and Skaerbaek believe that a major reason 
why artists tend to resist the implementation of accounting systems is that the disciplining power of 
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calculative practices intrudes on artists’ individual liberty and disrupts collective creative processes. Like 
hospitals, theatres are populated by ‘highly trained employees motivated by their professional standards 
that mostly do not include concepts from the logic implicit in accounting’ (1997: 432).  
In their study of accounting and marketing discourses in official documents relating to widening 
arts engagement in England, Oakes and Oakes discuss literature relating to the behavioural aspects of 
accounting systems. They view accounting ‘as an enforcer of colonising ideologies’ (2012: 213). Specifically, 
they link accounting to what they call a modernist discourse bound to ‘universalising and totalising 
knowledge claims’ (2012: 214). They believe that, ‘Through its connections with scientific knowledge, 
accounting information is often presented as an objective fact, ignoring the social context in which it is 
constructed’ and that ‘the purported “facts” in financial statements often gain a status that is abstracted 
from time so they seem to suggest something definitive and absolute about an organisation’ (2012: 214). 
Oakes and Oakes state that modernist accounting is an ‘influential discourse’ due to its ‘claims to absolute 
truth, certainty, and objectivity’. It follows that ‘attachment of these claims to accounting concepts such as 
cost-consciousness and efficiency make it difficult to question such concepts, and hence they become 
naturalised and useful for political purposes’ (2012: 214). They mark the contrast with literature that 
argues that ‘allocation processes are arbitrary and politicised’ and note the work of Chwastiak and Lehman 
(2008) who ‘highlight the human misery in which accounting is implicated when it is linked to the de-
humanising economic rationality of modernism with its emphasis on the maximisation of profit (or 
extraction of surplus value) at the expense of other values’ (2012: 213). 
One of the central problems confronting cultural policy is how the aesthetic aspects of culture can 
fit into public policy. Miller describes how the calculative practices of accountancy have become closely 
associated with the role of management ‘to the point that they have become almost indissociable’ (2001: 
387-8). For Zan (2000: 337; 2006: 9) arts organisations, confronting the rise of the forms of accounting 
found in government organisations, ‘are professional organizations, where a substantive-aesthetic culture 
prevails over the culture of management, generic and a-specific in itself. In such a context, it is 
management experts who find themselves in a position of alterity, being perceived as “deviant”, as 
witnesses to the clash between these two cultures the world over.’ There are three particular areas of 
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conflict, the first being that the cultural sector tends to perceive management and accountancy practices as 
an attack on ‘the very core of their professional identity’ (Zan, 2006: viii) and to view improvements in 
productivity as threats to artistic quality (Christiansen and Skaerbaek, 1997: 433). Second, many cultural 
institutions, such as the British Museum, La Scala and Pompeii, have for centuries been successfully 
‘managed according to nonmanagerial ways of managing’ (Zan, 2012: 14). And third that, in the UK case 
particularly, the accounting profession is excessively heavy-handed in ‘imposing rules and norms wrought 
in its own image’ (Zan, 2006: 11; 2000: 338) and ‘does not seem to know half measures’ (Zan, 2006: 10). 
In this light, when accountancy attempts to ‘calculate creativity’ (Christiansen and Skaerbaek, 1997: 
248) it is the enemy of aestheticism. As public management has adopted numeric techniques such as cost 
benefit analysis, a distance has been created from the aestheticism that is prevalent in many views of what 
publicly funded culture should be and the actual practices associated with the internal running of cultural 
organisations and external accountability to funders, such as the state.  
Recent work on this question (O’Brien, 2013; Prince, 2013; Stanziola, 2012) has highlighted the 
complex interplay between the differing forms of expertise present in cultural policy making. As Prince 
(2013: 1) points out ‘being an expert on matters of culture is popularly seen as a matter of subjective 
judgement’. Indeed this is the position that much of the sociology of culture has attempted to 
problematize. For both Bourdieu (2010) and later writers, including Chiapello (2004), the notion of 
expertise in aesthetic judgement was bound up with individuals’ and groups’ location within the stratified 
societies of Western Europe and also a broader ideology that demanded a specific and special social role 
for the artist and their work. 
At the time that questions of aesthetic value were central to cultural policy making, government 
had been reshaped by the trends of New Public Management (NPM) and its subsequent iterations of 
managerialism and Public Value. In the British context, of a Whitehall subject to almost 40 years of 
attempted reform, the effect of three influences, of Treasury, Public Choice Theory and Welfare Economics, 
resulted in a status quo that fixed the position of policy development within the framework of techniques 
such as cost benefit analysis. 
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In these circumstances, Whitehall policy making guidance, particularly from Treasury, framed policy 
as an activity of intervening and regulating markets, with the effects of such intervention to be judged via 
assessment of efficiency and effectiveness. In this mode of thought, the costs and benefits associated with 
any given policy should be compared with each other using a common standard or metric, which, in the 
case of cost benefit analysis was money. The emergence of the calculative device (Miller, 2001) of cost 
benefit analysis raised a complex question for cultural policy. If it was the case that the aesthetic aspects of 
culture demanded unique status, then how could culture, which in both anthropological and aesthetic 
senses denied its entanglements with the market, fit into public policy? To give one illustration, many 
cultural goods are free at the point of use in the UK, for example there is a longstanding policy of making 
entry into national galleries, such as the Tate, free of charge. In this context the price, paid for by general 
taxation, is not initially clear to the visitors.  If price, or cost, is not clear to the user, the benefits, which in 
economic terms are expressed in the price someone is willing to pay for the ticket, are similarly obscured.  
Before 2010 the state of the art in this area had used various proxies for the values of culture that 
were seen to be beyond market price. Beginning in the 1980s, both government and the cultural sector 
used estimates of social and economic impact. In those ways of thinking about culture, the value culture 
generated was approximated into economic outcomes, particularly in terms of tourist spend and media 
coverage, or social outcomes, such as community cohesion, or better educational and health outcomes. 
Unease with these approximations extended across both government and the cultural sector in the 
UK, even as both employed these devices with increasing sophistication. Notable voices, such as former 
Secretary of State for culture, Chris Smith, and former head of the Barbican, John Tusa, were vocal about 
the potentially compromised policies that resulted from a slavish devotion to Treasury forms of decision-
making. In particular, economic impact, as a way of trying to fit cultural policies into a cost benefit analysis 
framework, created objections from a vast range of commentators (e.g. Cowen, 2006: 15) who insisted that 
this risked reducing culture to a range of benefits that were better provided by other sectors of 
government intervention and failed to capture the full benefits of culture to individuals. 
However, the quest to fit into Whitehall’s NPM regime, coupled with the more recent 
retrenchment of public funding in the UK, has led both policy and organisations to pay closer attention to 
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how NPM frames decision-making. In the UK this is through HM Treasury’s Green Book, which provides 
guidance on how to conduct policy appraisal and evaluation. The text was introduced in 2003, as part of 
the twin pressures of the end of the first wave of New Labour’s Modernising Government agenda and the 
continued long march of HM Treasury control over Whitehall (a long march hastened by the centralising 
agenda of Gordon Brown). The Green Book sets out a process for policy making to follow, moving through a 
series of stages to answer two fundamental questions: Are there better ways to achieve this objective? Are 
there better uses for these resources? These questions are answered by cost benefit analysis that seeks to 
translate a variety of costs and benefits, some with no market prices, into financial terms. The use of cost 
benefit analysis is part of the way the guidance frames decision making as an intervention into the market, 
whereby the decision to intervene must be to correct market failure in a way that creates more ‘benefit’ 
than any alternative (or, indeed doing nothing). The guidance is thus reflective of both an economic view of 
society, the application of social scientific techniques to decision making, and the difficult issue of valuing 
activities or practices that may resist pricing or market trades.  
Thus the problem of valuing culture, in terms of how best to fit the unique aspects of culture, 
outside of the social and economic impacts, into the economic language of the welfare economic paradigm 
suggested by the guidance in government documents such as Treasury’s Green Book, remained unsolved 
despite almost 30 years of trying. 
 
3. Governing culture 
The push towards forms of policy making that were made transparent by the use of social science is 
substantiated in the British Treasury’s guidance on decision-making. The example of the British Treasury’s 
Green Book offers a straightforward case study of how bureaucratic formations have changed since the 
1970s, influenced both by market logics and economics, as well as critiques of the state. Burnham and 
Horton (2013) describe three elements of 'traditional' public administration: that politics and political 
decision making is separate from administrative work; that this administration was organised hierarchically, 
based on aptitude and merit, rather than personal connections, wealth or other forms of influence; and 
finally that this administration would have permanence, being recruited for life and exempt from the 
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electoral cycle that inevitably led to politicians’ limited time in office (Rush and Giddings, 2011). These 
three elements of traditional public management also encountered the application of scientific forms of 
management over the course of the twentieth century, as the management theories of modernity 
presented alternative organisational models (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007). 
The reasons for the adaptation, reform and rejection of the public management approach are 
highly disputed.  The influential public management theorists Osborne and Gaebler (1992) described the 
failure of traditional public management to deliver outcomes, offering a narrative concerned with the 
effectiveness of this system. This goes hand in hand with narratives of the state suggesting it had become 
overloaded by the demands for intervention in, and management of, economy and society. There was also, 
from economics, a critique that suggested bureaucratic managers were just as self-interested and just as 
political as their masters, seeking to maximise their bureaucratic empires at the expense of democratically 
elected politicians and the general public (McLean, 1987). This school of thought (Burnham and Horton, 
2013) also suggested hierarchical bureaucracy was inefficient compared to market forms of organisation. 
Harvey (2007) and other critical scholars saw these reforms as part of the global turn to a neo-liberal state 
settlement in favour of already wealthy and powerful groups. However these concerns cut across the 
ideological spectrum, in the same way that critiques of modernity came from a range of intellectual 
positions. Dissatisfaction with traditional public administration was taken up widely by politicians from a 
range of different ideological positions during the 1980s and 1990s, figuring in right-wing critiques of the 
inefficiency and self-interest of the state as well as left-wing demands to powerful state institutions for 
greater democracy, transparency and accountability. 
In the New Public Management the dominant form of organisation was the market as the type of 
social organisation that would not be subject to the problems associated with traditional public 
management. The management practices of market organisations were applied to public services at the 
same time as large swathes of public service provision were opened up to competition from private sector 
provision. As Osborne and Gaebler (1992) describe, administration was concerned with ’steering, not 
rowing’ the state, in an effort to lower costs. The state retained control of this ’contracted-out’ system of 
service provision by applying forms of measurement, considered against performance standards and 
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objectives (Burnham and Horton, 2013). The tools and techniques of measurement were used to make the 
world of public administration as it responded to the contradictions, ambivalences and ambiguities of 
modernity. 
Thus under NPM financial controls over the dispersal of public money shaped the environment in 
which economic actors operated. The government’s ability to withhold funds prompted actors to adopt 
common calculative practices, maintain networks, and to demonstrate shared interests and strategies 
(Rose and Miller, 1992: 198). Throughout the 1990s, arts organisations dependent on full or partial public 
funding became ‘an additional territory for the seemingly inexorable diffusion of managerial rhetoric’, and 
so came under pressure to adopt the language and practices of NPM and to demonstrate ‘value for 
money’. Albeit that this ‘colonization’ or ‘contamination’ happened ‘reluctantly rather than willingly’ and at 
a slower pace than within, for example, the education and health care sectors (Ferri and Zan, 2014: 368; 
Zan 2006: viii; 11-12; Zan, 2000: 336-7). 
 
4. Measuring cultural value  
While this reading of public administration in modernity has important implications for culture, it also plays 
out in other areas of public life where the adoption of calculative practices has been contested. For 
example, there have been related debates about introducing an assessment of the economic and social 
impact of university research in the UK as part of the 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF). This 
exercise decided the allocation of around £2 billion per year in block funding to higher education 
institutions, and impact criteria counted for 20% of the evaluation. The initial proposal from the Treasury 
was to use a metrics-only approach to gauge the impact of university research upon the economy and 
industry. However the metrics proposed, such as grants from business, and numbers of patents and spin-
out companies created, were found to be very low order measures of such impact. The proposed model 
also centred on the natural and physical sciences and so neglected the humanities, arts, and social sciences, 
and had little relevance for gauging the wider social, cultural and economic benefits of academic research 
(Donovan, 2007). 
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After public consultation, and discussions with the academic community, the metrics-only model 
was abandoned. The Higher Education Funding Councils commissioned a report on international best 
practice (RAND Europe, 2009) and adopted a narrative approach to assessing research impact based on the 
design of Australia’s proposed equivalent to the UK’s REF, the Research Quality Framework (RQF), which 
used case studies informed, where appropriate, by robust indicators or metrics (Donovan, 2008). In this 
respect calculative approaches were adapted to employ mixed methods to capture more meaningful 
descriptions of impact. For example, broader social and cultural impacts were initially disregarded as being 
‘intangible’ through the lens of economic calculation, yet were made tangible by adopting both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. Critically, the RQF model on which impact assessment for the 
2014 REF was based, was strongly influenced by lobbying from academics and their professional 
associations in the humanities, arts, and social sciences, arguing that robust evidence of the social, 
economic, environmental and cultural impacts of research could best be found using a combination of 
narratives and appropriate indicators or metrics (CHASS, 2005). The cases of the RQF and 2014 REF 
represent a moment in modernity where academics engaged with the policy making process and disrupted, 
opened up, and reshaped the use of calculative practices within government. One may, however, question 
whether the rejection of a metrics-only approach constitutes an escape from the calculative practices of 
government, as a mixed methods approach expands the terrain made calculable. 
 In light of these developments, we now turn to explore the limitations of the British approach to 
measuring culture, and then discuss an alternative holistic approach that synthesises capturing the unique 
aspects of culture with the calculative practices embodied in the Treasury’s Green Book. Stated preference, 
revealed preference, and subjective wellbeing approaches are the government’s preferred methods for 
assessing the economic value of culture (Fujiwara and Campbell, 2011; H. M. Treasury, 2003: 57-8), yet 
these are associated with various technical, practical and philosophical limitations when applied to the 
cultural sector (Donovan, 2014; 2013). We now describe these techniques and their key strengths and 
weaknesses. 
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Stated preference and revealed preference techniques are used to estimate the non-market values of 
cultural goods and services, and have for some time been an important component of cost-benefit analysis 
(Fujiwara and Campbell, 2011: 7). Stated preference techniques are based on hypothetical future markets, 
and questionnaires are constructed to elicit people’s maximum willingness to pay for particular cultural 
goods. A key strength is that in addition to use value, stated preference approaches also estimate non-use 
value, such as a person’s willingness to pay to support a local library even though they may never intend to 
use it but gain satisfaction from the fact that other people may do so now and in the future. It follows that 
money values can be established for otherwise unobservable cultural benefits. This is of particular 
importance for the cultural sector, where in terms of the total economic value of a good required for social 
cost-benefit analysis, its non-use value may greatly exceed its use value. Relatively few stated preference 
studies have been applied to the cultural sector, particularly in the UK. There are concerns that 
respondents may overstate their willingness to pay in a hypothetical situation. Revealed preference 
techniques infer people’s willingness to pay for a cultural good by observing actual behaviour in related 
markets (e.g. the differential cost of rental or housing prices related to proximity to cultural goods) or in 
consuming the good itself (e.g. the cost of theatre tickets and travel). But revealed preference techniques 
do not capture the non-use value of cultural goods and so may severely undervalue the total economic 
value of a cultural good. 
 
Benefits transfer is an approach to economic valuation that takes preference-based economic values from a 
previous study (the study site) and then uses these values in a similar decision-making context (the policy 
site) and calculates new preference-based economic values to aid social cost-benefit analysis (Pearce et al., 
2002: 16; 35). Its major appeal lies in the fact that the opportunity costs of conducting original studies are 
high and so the need to conduct preference-based studies ‘would be vastly reduced’ (Pearce et al., 2002: 
35; 135). Cultural assets tend to be unique as they display ‘complex characteristics, which may make value 
transfer subject to considerable error’ (Provins et al., 2008: 142) because this heterogeneity clashes with 
the fact that benefits transfer relies on a stock of homogenous goods. In other words, benefits transfer 
depends on the strength of similarity between the original study and the new policy site, yet unique 
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cultural goods have no comparisons. For benefits transfer to be valid there must be a strong similarity 
between the study site and the policy site, and a sufficient pool of relevant preference-based studies to 
draw from, particularly when considering the diverse range and scale of goods and services the cultural 
sector offers across the arts, built heritage, galleries, libraries, and museums. Provins et al. (2008: 166) 
found worldwide 33 examples of preference-based studies applied to the valuation of cultural heritage, 11 
of which were in the UK and relate to fairly distinct areas and had little consistency in types of data 
gathered. Yet this small number of cultural heritage studies represented the bulk of all such UK studies in 
the cultural sector. The fact that there are a very small number of preference-based studies applied to the 
UK cultural sector, and the fact that these are in distinct areas, effectively rules out the possibility of 
benefits transfer. 
 
Subjective wellbeing approaches attempt to infer value from the relationship between wellbeing and 
income, and are an attempt to ‘measure people’s experiences rather than expose their preferences’ 
(Fujiwara & Campbell, 2011: 7) and thus avoid having to ask people their willingness to pay. In terms of 
culture the aim is to be able to understand the value of cultural engagement through the relationship 
between wellbeing and income. It is, however, hard to claim that an increase in reported wellbeing is linked 
to cultural engagement or linked to a particular policy. And this is very much viewed as ‘an evolving 
methodology and existing valuations are not sufficiently accepted as robust enough for direct use in Social 
Cost Benefit Analysis’ (H. M. Treasury, 2003: 58; Fujiwara & Campbell, 2011: 5). 
 
In practical terms, these approaches collectively require high levels of expertise, and are complex, time-
consuming and expensive. The financial and opportunity costs required are beyond the means of the 
majority of cultural enterprises and projects, and so run against the principle of proportionality, i.e. the 
notion that the cost and effort required to supply data should be relative to the size of public funds 
requested. While it is appropriate to use economic valuation techniques to assess the benefits of large 
capital projects or national policies, this is impracticable for the majority of cultural sector organisations. In 
philosophical terms, the wholesale use of economic valuation techniques is unpopular as this grates against 
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the cultural sector ethos, and more specifically there are concerns that the uniqueness and quality of the 
cultural goods in question cannot be represented by economic measures. However, appropriate or not, 
these techniques allow DCMS to render culture calculable and hence governable. 
It follows that there is a paradox in DCMS’s work, in the need to fit culture into the calculative practices 
of the Treasury, while facing resistance to these practices and the reality of their practical 
inappropriateness for smaller organisations. This paradox is related to DCMS’s comparatively weak position 
in Whitehall (O’Brien, 2013a), whereby capability reviews highlighted the lack of evidence-based policy 
making and capacity within the department. Moreover it is linked to DCMS’s role as a distributor of funding 
to policy making quangos, in particular Arts Council England, that are more directly responsible for dealing 
with arts organisations. The arms-length principle (Hewison, 1995) that DCMS does not interfere in cultural 
or artistic decisions means the department is removed from the policy concerns of smaller- or medium-
sized arts organisations whilst at the same time having to represent those policy concerns in the language 
of the Treasury. 
 
5. Alternative approaches to valuing culture 
The results of this paradox point towards the need for alternatives to a solely economic framework for 
valuing culture. There have been two academic projects with DCMS on measuring cultural value, and the 
Phase One project reviewed various measures of cultural value endorsed by the Treasury’s Green Book 
(O’Brien, 2010). The Phase Two project tested the principle of adopting an additional range of quantitative, 
qualitative and narrative techniques that were accessible to the whole cultural sector (Donovan, 2013; 
2014) and the result was unanimous cultural sector support for a holistic approach to valuing culture that 
used mixed methods which could vary according to context. The holistic approach was seen as being 
responsive to scale; and the possible combination of economic, other quantitative, and qualitative 
approaches was readily accepted on the grounds of being cheaper and more accessible, and also because 
this combination of methods captured a broader range of cultural value than standard government 
calculative practices. Treasury representatives in the Phase Two project workshops also agreed that in 
addition to economic valuation techniques, alternative methods, including narrative approaches, could 
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enhance large bids for public funds by demonstrating a layer of ‘added cultural value’. In this respect the 
recent £2 million investment by the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council in its Cultural Value Project 
represents a timely initiative to develop and test a wide range of techniques for capturing the value of 
culture (AHRC, 2015). 
 A key argument against the use of non-economic approaches to valuing culture is that while this 
information can be considered within the context of social cost-benefit analysis, it ultimately sits outside 
the valuation framework: non-economic approaches are less ‘calculable’ because they do not offer a simple 
monetary value. However, both Phase One and Phase Two of the academic projects with DCMS found that 
multi-criteria analysis (MCA) provides an alternative framework to guide decision-making processes for 
funding non-marketed cultural goods and services, and can be informed by a range of economic and non-
economic data. Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) proceeds by creating a performance matrix, where rows 
describe options, and columns rate the performance of options against various criteria; and this rating can 
be numerical or even colour-coded. In a simple format, this matrix in itself may be the final product, and 
decision-makers are given this information on which to base their deliberations. More complex versions of 
this approach such as multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) use a specialised computer programme to 
convert the performance matrix into consistent numerical values (DCLG, 2009: 21). It is important to 
consider the viewpoints of various stakeholders or affected groups of people when deriving criteria, either 
through involving those parties directly, or conducting research into, for example, policy statements 
provided by interest groups (DCLG, 2009: 33).  
 The strengths of MCA for valuing culture are that it makes economic and non-economic data 
commensurable; it can be used to appraise the benefits of purely non-economic data; it can involve expert 
judgement on the selection and weighting of criteria; it can involve the opinions of various stakeholders 
and affected groups on the weighting of criteria; and it can be relatively simple to perform if complex 
weighting and scoring is excluded. Its limitations are that using weighting and scoring can be quite complex, 
and so needs relevant expertise, and may be more technical and time-consuming than social cost-benefit 
analysis; disputes may occur over the relative weights to be assigned to the criteria; it may not necessarily 
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include data derived from people’s preferences; and there is a need to ensure that weighting and scoring 
are not arbitrary. 
 The purpose of MCA within government is to allow a small team of people to assess options and 
provide advice to decision-makers. Like cost-benefit analysis, MCA is a decision-making aid that allows the 
appraisal of various options, however MCA differs in that unlike social cost-benefit analysis it can directly 
incorporate economic and non-economic data and make these commensurable, and it can also proceed 
solely with non-economic data. Crucially, MCA is endorsed by the Green Book for use when valuing non-
marketed goods, and is increasingly being used to inform government decision-making in areas such as 
transport and environment policy, which take into consideration a combination of monetary and non-
monetary data, including qualitative information on impacts on the landscape, and ‘as an “alternative” to 
defining monetary values for all the major costs and benefits when this is impractical’ (DCLG, 2009: 5; 9). 
MCA provides a single framework within which it is possible to deal consistently with large amounts of 
complex information derived from using diverse methods. In this way, ‘MCA techniques can be used to 
identify a single most preferred option, to rank options, to short-list a number of options for subsequent 
detailed appraisal, or simply to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable possibilities’ (2009: 19). In the UK 
the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions used MCA for the appraisal of 67 schemes 
in the Roads Review, including options for Stonehenge (DETR, 1998). 
In terms of its application to the cultural sector, Provins et al. (2008: 133) discuss the use of MCA in 
the context of attempting to place a value on the non-use benefits of the preservation of cultural heritage 
assets when there is a lack of information on the monetary value of this preservation. They recommend 
that appraisal can nonetheless be undertaken: in its simplest form expert opinion would be sought, which 
would then feed into quantitative and qualitative assessments of the relevant issues using weighting and 
scoring. Examples of the application of MCA internationally also apply to heritage in the context of the 
sustainability of various proposed projects for the redevelopment of Venice Arsenale, where assessment 
criteria included intrinsic sustainability, context sustainability, and economic-financial feasibility (Giove et 
al., 2010); and the grading of 69 heritage sites in Calcutta, where assessment criteria included historical 
 17 
value, architectural value, sociocultural value, signs of deterioration, accessibility, integrity, public opinion, 
local response and usability (Dutta and Hussain, 2009). 
 The option of using MCA allows a broad articulation of the value of culture that is nonetheless 
endorsed by the Treasury. This removes the paradox in DCMS’s work: there is general acceptance of mixed-
methods approaches throughout the cultural sector and MCA can be applied by DCMS to large-scale 
cultural investments and by arms-length organisations to smaller cultural enterprises. The Phase One and 
Phase Two projects’ recommendations that DCMS adapt its calculative practices to use mixed methods to 
assess the value of culture has clear parallels with the case of academic lobbying to use mixed methods to 
assess the impact of research in the RQF and the 2014 REF. In both cases academics engaged with the 
policy making process, with the potential to decentre and open up the use of calculative practices within 
government. In the DCMS’s case, cultural value was rendered ‘intangible’ through the lens of calculative 
practices, yet could be made tangible by the use of MCA as an valuation framework that incorporates 
economic and non-economic data. It is ironic that DCMS’s need to fit into the calculative practices of the 
Treasury has led to policies wedded to economic calculation, while a more fitting approach for assessing 
the value of culture – multi-criteria analysis – is firmly embedded in the Treasury’s Green Book and provides 
a compelling solution to this impasse. Yet while this compromise may be compelling from the viewpoint of 
arts organisations, DCMS, as a relatively small and vulnerable government department, has to date 
displayed a preference for economic valuation techniques that produce a monetary value, rendering 
culture calculable and governable within the network of government. 
 
6. Culture and expertise 
When applied to the cultural sector, the ‘alternative accounting discourse’ tends to regard arts 
organisations as ‘fragile institutions’ under the dual threat of the calculative practices of NPM and the 
excesses of management and accounting culture (Zan, 2012: 5). There is, however, a desire to find solutions 
to accounting for the arts ‘but in modest doses’ (Zan, 2000: 337) that balance planning and artistic freedom 
(Christiansen and Peter Skaerbaek, 1997:  429) and in ‘more creative and less modernistic ways in order to 
encourage more emancipatory forms of accounting’ (Oakes and Oakes, 2012: 221). While multi-criteria 
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analysis presents a possible solution, this nonetheless remains a discussion framed by calculative practices: 
‘Even when individuals seek to subvert or avoid calculations made of them, their actions still take place in 
reference to an economic norm based on accounting numbers’ (Miller, 2001: 393-4). Within sociological 
literature on states and calculative devices (e.g. Scott, 1998; Mitchell, 2002) there is a straightforward 
critique of the preceding discussion. The application of devices of calculation, such as multi-criteria analysis, 
is an application of the existing power of states to open up new territories to be governed, in this example 
the territory of the subsidised cultural sector. Alongside this new territory for government comes the 
commensurative effects of comparing different values within the same analytical framework, and 
subsuming the non-financial into the calculable.  A critical position drawing on this literature might raise the 
spectre, as Bauman (2004) has done, of the inherent violence of reducing culture, the sphere that offered 
alternative visions of the social in the work of thinkers as diverse as Keat (1999) and Adorno, to both the 
realm of the bureaucratic and the realm of the market in one fell swoop. Bureaucratic control runs the risk 
of removing what is specifically beyond the state from within culture, whilst market production risks only 
offering the homogeneity of what will command an exchange value. The risk of submitting culture to multi-
criteria analysis may then be to see it enveloped by the realms from which it is both distinct and might thus 
offer critique. 
However, seeing the state as an aggregate of calculative practices, which is one reading of the 
tradition within which Scott (1998) and Mitchell (2002) write, may go too far from the specificity of 
individual departmental traditions and experiences that shape the impact and use of calculative devices. As 
Prince (2013: 14) argues ‘blanket assessments that calculative reason instrumentalises or disciplines 
cultural activity conceded too much to it…it has not necessarily colonised the subsidised cultural sector’. To 
address this point, and by way of conclusion, as well as to offer a response to the risks of commensuration 
posed by the recommendation of multi-criteria analysis, the paper will now consider the specificities of 
cultural policy. 
Whilst there is an extensive literature ranging across various issues in cultural policy (for an 
overview see O’Brien, 2013) the most pertinent work for the purposes of this discussion focuses on the role 
of accounting experts in cultural policy. This is because the recommendation as to the usefulness, or not, of 
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multi-criteria analysis is bound up with the position of academic expertise within cultural policy making. It is 
also bound up with a series of structural factors, not least of which is the peripheral and weaker status of 
the UK’s ministry of culture vis-à-vis the Treasury, which make the application of that expertise worthy of 
consideration. 
By way of an example it is worth considering the contradictory status of expertise and evidence 
within British cultural policy. In the first instance cultural policy is, perhaps more than any other area of 
policy, the clearest example of policy-based evidence making (Slater, 2012). Selwood (2002) identifies the 
irrelevance of data collection and the use of statistics to the practices of cultural policy, whereby an 
industry of Whitehall civil servants, consultants and academics has been bound up with the production of 
data that has served little or no purpose in decisions over cultural policy. Indeed the fate of the work of 
Miles and Sullivan (2012), which was directly critical of foundational cultural policies including the 
subsidising of free entry to national organisations, support Selwood’s analysis. Miles and Sullivan’s report, 
written as part of the same stream of DCMS research as the Phase One and Phase Two measuring cultural 
value projects, did little to alter the insistence by both Labour and subsequently the Coalition 
administration on a ‘deficit model’ of cultural policy aimed at those from marginalised social and economic 
groups. 
If cultural policy is, therefore, an area of government activity that has shown little concern with 
allowing evidence to influence policy making, why is the role of expertise of interest? It is important 
because, despite the problems associated with the effectiveness of evidence and expertise, cultural policy 
has been highly dependent on evidence and expertise for a new form of legitimacy as an area of 
government policy in the UK, then subsequently worldwide, since 1997. This is because the notion of 
creative industries has been the driving force for the reorientation of cultural policy as potentially central to 
policymakers’ attempts to found new forms of economic activity that were not associated with Fordist 
manufacturing that had prevailed in the twentieth century. 
 Statistical expertise, driven by the academic status of many of the individuals who contributed to 
initial mapping documents that helped to define creative industries, has been crucial. Campbell (2013) has 
shown how both the definition of what a creative industry is, or is not, was totally dependent on the ability 
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of, in the UK, the Office for National Statistics and other government data-gathering agencies to monitor 
and measure specific forms of economic activity. Moreover the global career of creative industries and the 
associated success of the term in inserting itself into a range of policy contexts that had little or nothing to 
do with the British, Whitehall, model of politics and public administration, was directly dependent on the 
ability of creative industries to offer growth for the British economy. This offer of growth was bound up in 
definitional debates that yoked software design to more traditional cultural activity such as the visual arts. 
Thus cultural policy’s story in recent years is of a contradictory rejection of large amounts of data produced 
by the application of governmental monitoring systems to institutions such as museums and galleries at the 
same time as a dependence on highly questionable data on the economic efficacy of the role of culture and 
creativity. 
What then should be the role of the accounting academic if their recommendations are both 
demanded and ignored? One way of conceiving of this is to follow recent ethnographic work in Whitehall 
(Rhodes, 2011; Stevens, 2011) that has shown how uneven and almost random the take-up and use of 
academic evidence in government can be. Moreover, one might observe the dynamics of policy making, 
particularly its speed and need for clarity and certainty, and conclude that any settlement with policy is to 
subordinate and thus damage the function of the academic in contemporary society. 
However, the latter position is unsatisfactory. In a recent paper Schlesinger (2013) draws on the 
work of Zygmunt Bauman to discuss the role of the academic in cultural policy making.  For Bauman (1992) 
the academic (or more specifically the intellectual) is caught between the promise of their expertise to 
grant them the power to make definitive pronouncements on social issues, to legislate, and the 
postmodern suspicion of legislative certainty that offers the academic the opportunity to offer 
interpretations, particularly of competing narratives. Schlesinger (2013: 34) finds a path between these 
options in two ways, which are worth directly quoting at length: 
 
‘First, under ideal, unconstrained conditions, our research practice would lead us, as a matter of 
course, to contribute to discussion and deliberation through various forms of public engagement. 
This might and does include the production and publication of independent research. It might also 
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entail academics joining boards and commissions, supplying expert advice to governments and 
agencies, advising parliamentary committees, making submissions to public inquiries, offering 
assistance to civil society organizations, contributing to media and so forth’ 
 
And another model that reflects the auditing regime of British universities, the REF and the so-called impact 
agenda, whereby academics are forced into a  
 
‘necessity-driven, demand-led model. Ideal-typically, you produce research and engage in 
knowledge exchange in line with what is requested in order to justify your existence. Public 
intellectuality, therefore, is wanted but only on certain, quite instrumental, terms’  
 
In both regimes the academic is still potentially acting as legislator. However it is an action constrained by 
both the question of the legitimacy of the academics to act in this fashion, pace Bauman, and the question 
of motivation. If academics are driven only to contribute expertise to policy because they are expected to 
do so as part of funding agreements and bureaucratic monitoring, then by definition their findings may be 
suspect. This is not to comment on the robustness of any given academic interaction with government. 
Rather, it is to point to the need for a continued space for academia to create understandings of the social 
world that deal with the dilemmas facing policymakers. The discussion of multi-criteria analysis is one such 
example, grounded as it is in a recognition of the structural constraints facing policy making, for example 
Treasury power and the role of a specific form of balancing the costs and benefits of interventions. 
 Such considerations resonate with discussions of the role of expertise, calculative reason, and 
practices of accounting in the governmentality literature (Miller and Rose, 2008; Rose, 2001). On the one 
hand, accounting professionals and academics provide the technical expertise that informs state calculative 
practices, the effects of which extend beyond government to invisibly permeate the everyday lives of 
citizens. It is this ‘know how’ that makes government possible through the ‘calculated administration of 
diverse aspects of conduct’ (Rose and Miller 1992: 175-7). On the other hand, accounting scholars provide a 
surveillance role through audit and evaluation of government programmes and (potential) recipients of 
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government funding. For example, the expert has gained an important social role, and is perceived as 
‘embodying neutrality, authority and skill in a wise figure, operating according to an ethical code’ and being 
‘beyond good and evil’; yet the figure of the expert is held to have evolved as a bridge between political will 
and regulating private actions (1992: 187). Expertise and accounting is therefore not neutral, but provides a 
means of inscribing activities so that they can be evaluated and governed. Accounting scholars and 
academics also act as interpreters in, for example, framing and reframing the terms of performance 
measurement and what counts as success or failure, and in the context of this paper what constitutes 
cultural value. In this sense, academics can create ‘enclosures’ of concentrated skills and authority, and 
thus challenge political authority (1992: 188). 
 
7. Conclusion 
The above discussion returns us to the question of whether cultural policy is unique or special, or are the 
dynamics under consideration in this paper merely reflections of how states and their governments 
function under our current modernity? Comparative work across other areas of public sector life is clearly 
necessary. But taken as a case study, cultural policy points to the reality of calculative practices as both 
useful for decision-makers, bearers of risks and threats to the objects of calculation, and finally sites 
whereby the complicated and uncertain position of the modern accounting academic can be worked out. It 
is in the position of the academic, their role and function with regard to state power, which we can hope to 
monitor the effects of calculation, as Prince (2013), Stanziola (2012) and Schlesinger (2013) have done with 
regard to cultural policy, whilst opening important reflexive positions for the profession. The future, under 
REF, will, as Schlesinger suggests, be one of an enforced usefulness for academics working with policy. The 
task for the accounting academic is to create this relationship on terms of their own, by applying their 
expertise as we have sought to do in this paper, as opposed to being captured or ignored by the ideologies 
and the techniques of government. 
 Martin (2010) outlines the mutual benefits and risks that can emerge when academics engage in 
research with practitioners in government. He presents a spectrum of research that is co-produced by 
academics and practitioners, ranging from practitioners being relatively passive informants to being highly 
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active in the commissioning, conduct and oversight of research projects. While higher levels of engagement 
increase the likelihood that research will be utilised (or have ‘impact’) there is also a higher risk of the 
research process becoming politicised. With regard to academic engagement with cultural policy making, 
Donovan elsewhere reflects on how the findings of the Phase One and Phase Two measuring cultural value 
projects were received within DCMS (Donovan, 2014: 24-6). While both projects recommended the use of 
multi-criteria analysis, Phase One was a review of potential techniques for measuring cultural value, and 
was perceived to support DCMS policy. Phase Two focused on translating Phase One recommendations into 
policy, and was initially criticised on the grounds that its recommended holistic approach ran counter to 
Green Book requirements, although a subsequent change in the cultural policy environment led to the view 
that the holistic approach was, in fact, Green Book compliant. As our discussion of the work of Miller and 
Rose (2008), Bauman (1992) and Schlesinger (2013) demonstrates, the role of the expert in government, 
including that of the accounting scholar, is neither disinterested nor value neutral. We have shown that the 
role of the academic expert within government – acting as legislator and/or interpreter – is inherently 
political. Yet, as the example of the Phase One and Phase Two cultural value projects illustrates, a reflexive 
approach can be used to decentre calculative practices while also opening up possibilities for deeper 
engagement with cultural sector values and retaining the patina of Green Book legitimacy. 
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